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Introduction
The role of taxation in explaining international allocation of investment has been a subject of immense theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Undoubtedly, several factors a¤ect the location decision of a multinational …rm. The tax system of the potential host economy is one of these factors positioning this issue on the intersection of several branches of economies: public …nance, international economics and international business.
Earlier empirical studies based on aggregate …gures on foreign direct investment (FDI) suggest that high taxes negatively impact the ‡ow of FDI; de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and Hines (1999) . Recent empirical works exploit data at the …rm level to estimate the e¤ects of taxes on the decision where to allocate the a¢ liate of the multinational …rm. By relying on microeconomic data, these studies can provide information on the impact of taxes on behavioural responses of multinational …rms to international di¤erences in taxation and adequately account for di¤erences across …rms and industries. However, most existing empirical studies treat FDI modes as homogenous projects missing one crucial piece of information, namely, the distinction between Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and Green…eld investment projects (new ventures). 1 In this study, we progress to account for the mode of investment in estimating the e¤ect of di¤erences in international tax rates on the probability of choosing a location for an a¢ liate of a multinational …rm. Speci…cally, there are reasons to expect that the location decision of Green…eld investments is more sensitive to di¤erences in international tax rates than the location decision of M&A projects. First, if the potential M&A project is located in a high tax country, a part of taxes might be capitalised reducing the acquisition price. This capitalisation e¤ect is less pronounced in the case of a Green…eld investment and suggests that M&A investments should react less to high taxes than Green…eld investments do. Second, M&A decisions depend on the availability of appropriate targets. In principle, the set of potential locations for establishing a new plant might be larger than that of potential locations of target …rms to be acquired. This may make the multinational …rm less constrained in optimising over the location decision of the new venture.
In our econometric analysis, we employ detailed …rm-level data on German outbound FDI covering about 3600 …rms in the period from 2005 to 2007. The valuable feature of this dataset is that since 2005 the German investor has to report whether a new FDI project is a Green…eld or M&A project. This enables us to directly identify the mode of investment at the entry. In our sample, 34 percent of …rms enter the host economy as a Green…eld project. The US is the largest receiver of new FDI entries with a share of about 11 percent of total German new outbound FDI projects.
Our main …ndings are summarised as follows. First, if we do not distinguish between the modes of entry, high tax rates reduce the probability of the location to be chosen by a German FDI investor for its new a¢ liate. This …nd- ing is in line with results by Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998) on the location of US multinationals abroad. Our second …nding however reveals that Green…eld investments are signi…cantly more elastic to international taxation than M&A investments. According to our logit estimates and after controlling for …rm and country-speci…c characteristics, an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent reduces the probability of choosing a country to host a Green…eld investment by about 6.4 percent. The tax elasticity for M&A investments however, although negative, is signi…cantly smaller and only about 3.6 percent. Our study is the …rst to document this empirical …nding using outbound microeconomic data. The notable exception linked to our study is Swenson (2001) who examines the composition of FDI within the US and reports that Green…eld activities are more deterred than M&A activities from investing in high tax states. 2 The idea that the impact of taxation may depend on the modes of FDI traces back to Auerbach and Hassett (1991) who argue that tax reforms can alter the incentive of investing in acquisition of old capital versus investing in new capital. Becker and Fuest (2008) present a theoretical model of tax competition in which an increase in the tax rate raises the number of M&A investments and lowers the number of Green…eld investments. Huizinga and Voget (2009) examine the impacts of double taxation on the organisational structure following cross-border M&A activities. They …nd that countries with high levels of international double taxation are less inclined to host the new parent …rm after the merger or acquisition has occurred. 3 Recent contributions in the literature on the theory of international trade predict that …rm and project-speci…c characteristics play the major role in determining the mode of entry. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Ra¤ et al. (2009) show that more productive …rms tend to enter the foreign market as a Green…eld rather than M&A investment. In line with this result, Andersson and Svensson (1994) …nd that high technological skills and research and development intensity favour Green…eld operations. Neary (2007) introduces an oligopolistic market structure in a general equilibrium framework and shows that …rms acquire their high cost revivals. In Nocke and Yeaple (2007) , …rms involve in M&A activities to complement their abilities.
From a policy perspective, our …nding that high tax countries are less attractive particularly for Green…eld investments suggests that high tax countries miss the chance of collecting additional tax revenues mainly because new Green…eld projects are allocated to low tax countries. Furthermore, the di¤erent impacts of high tax rates on the composition of FDI is also of economic interest as Green-…eld investments and M&A can have di¤erent implications on the host economy. M&A activities involve a change in the pattern of ownership rights but to a less extent involve international reallocation of capital or an increase in production capacity or labour demand. Furthermore, the pattern of productivity spillovers from multinational a¢ liates to domestic …rms through knowledge spillovers and changing the competition structure of the host economy may di¤er between M&A and Green…eld projects; Balsvik and Haller (2007) .
This study proceeds as follows. In section two, we present our empirical approach and describe the German …rm-level FDI dataset. We report the main results in section three, and present a robustness analysis in section four. Finally, we conclude in section …ve.
2 Empirical methodology and data
Investigation approach
Our econometrical analysis is cross-sectional focusing on …rms at the entry and is based on a rich literature on FDI location choice. The …rm selects the location associated with the highest expected pro…t. 4 Pro…t functions ( i ) associated with each location i = 1; 2; : : : ; n are:
where j denotes either a Green…eld or a M&A investment. The variable i is the corporate tax rate in location i. R i is revenue and C i is the cost function which can depend on several factors such as: output, cost of labour, agglomeration and other external economies e¤ects etc. The term I j i ( i ) captures the initial cost of the FDI in the case of Green…eld projects and the purchase price in the case of M&A projects. The optimal levels of output can be derived by solving the system of …rst order conditions. Optimal pro…ts ( i ) can be computed by substituting the optimal levels of output in the corresponding pro…t functions. Ultimately, however, our focus here is on the e¤ects of taxation on location decisions of M&A versus Green…eld investments.
High taxes in the host economy lower future cash ‡ows of the cross-border investment in the case of M&A as well as the case of Green…eld projects. Hence, high taxes deter both types of FDI. However, in the case of a M&A project the acquisition price is a function of the tax rate. The value of a …rm is the present value of the cash payo¤s that the claim holders of the …rm receive; Healy and Palepu (2007) . Corporate taxation reduces the value of a …rm; Modigliani and Miller (1963) . Consequently, a high tax rate may reduce the …nal price paid by the buyer for a potential …rm. Huizinga, Voget, and Wagner (2008) provide empirical evidence on a capitalisation e¤ect of taxes in takeover premiums. Hence, if part of the tax is capitalised in the purchase price then
This capitalisation e¤ect however is expected to be smaller in the case of a Green-…eld investment since many mobile capital goods might be purchased at world prices. Thus, the capitalisation of taxes in the acquisition price suggests that the impact of taxes on the location decision is mitigated in the case of M&A investments as compared to the case of Green…eld investments.
Empirically, we observe the binary latent variable:
1 if k;l > k;i , i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and l 6 = i 0 otherwise
where the subscript k denotes …rms. The pro…tability of location l depends inter alia on the statutory corporate income tax rate in location l ( l ):
where is an intercept, and are the coe¢ cients of interest, is the vector of coe¢ cients corresponding to the controls and k;l is a residual. To investigate whether or not the two modes of investment react di¤erently to taxes, we include the interaction term M &A* , where M &A is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the investment takes the form of M&A and zero if the investment is a Green…eld project. The multiplication of the M &A dummy and the tax rate is required to compute interaction e¤ects. 5 The vector x k;l is a vector of alternative-speci…c controls that includes country-speci…c controls, i.e. controls that vary across countries but not …rms, as well as …rm-country controls that vary across countries but are …rm speci…c. In some speci…cations, we also take into account industry-speci…c e¤ects.
The probability of …rm k choosing location l is given by:
This logit model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The tax variable l is central in our analysis and its impact is expected to be negative and larger in absolute value for Green…eld than M&A investments. The identi…cation is based on cross-sectional variation in tax rates. Data on taxes are taken from Mintz and Weichenrieder (forthcoming). Table (1) displays the statutory corporate income tax rates for the countries in our sample. In 2006 for example, it exhibits a minimum rate of 12.5 percent in Ireland and a maximum rate of 40.7 percent in Japan.
The vector x k;l includes several variables that are related to the probability of locating an a¢ liate in a host economy. (1) The previous presence of a …rm in location l is captured by the number of a¢ liates already operating in the host economy (no: af f iliates). The presence of a …rm in an economy may increase the probability of selecting that economy again. (2) The total …xed and intangible assets invested by the parent …rm in location l (total assets) accounts for the size of the prior investment of the parent …rm in location l.
(3) The level of development of the host economy is captured by the GDP per capita (gdp capita). (4) The market size of the host economy is captured by its population (population). The level of development and market size both are expected to have positive e¤ects on the probability of entering. (5) The local labour market condition is captured by the labour freedom component of the Heritage index of economic freedom (labour f reedom). This proxy is computed based on four factors: minimum wages, rigidity of hours, di¢ culty of …ring redundant employees and cost of …ring redundant employees. 6 The labour freedom index is expected to be positively related to the probability of choosing a location l; the higher the ‡exibility of the labour market the higher the probability of entering the economy. 7 (6) The distance between Germany and the location of the FDI project (distance). The inclusion of this variable is in the tradition of the gravity literature. It captuers transport (trade) costs and may also capture investors' information on market conditions in the host economy. Distance is typically associated with a negative estimated coe¢ cient. (7) The openness of the host economy to international trade is captured by the ratio (imports l + exports l )/gdp l (openness). This proxy may capture two opposite aspects. For example, the tari¤-jumping argument suggests that the probability of entering a relatively closed economy is rather high in order to get access to the market. At the same time, economies that are more open to international trade may be more open to international investments. (8) The quality of institution is captured by a corruption index (corruption). We employ the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. We rede…ne it such that a high value of this index indicates a high level of corruption. Further, we include industry dummies in some speci…cations. These dummies account for di¤erence across industries and potential industry-speci…c economies of scales considerations. All level variables are expressed in terms of natural logarithm. In the robustness analysis, we examine the e¤ects of the e¤ective tax rate and further country-speci…c characteristics such as the R&D intensity and the ratio of market capitalisation of listed …rms. The reader is referred to the data appendix for a detailed description and the sources of the variables that are used in our study.
Firm data and descriptive statistics
The German foreign trade and payments regulation obliges all German …rms and individuals investing abroad and satisfying the reporting requirements to report key information such as balance sheet items as well as economic sectors of the parent …rm and its a¢ liates. In contrast to several …rm-level data sources, a valuable feature of this dataset is the inclusion of the entire population of FDI …rms rather than being exclusive to listed or "big"…rms. Since 2005, German investors are required to report whether a new investment is a Green…eld or M&A project. 8 This is a novel piece of information that enables us to directly identify the mode of entry and conduct our empirical investigation. We exclude from our sample banks, …nancial and non-pro…t institutions since such institutions face special tax treatments. wages are not available for many countries in our sample. 8 The investor has to check in the reporting form one of four possible options of outbound FDI: (1) new entry Green…eld project, (2) new entry M&A project, (3) already existing …rm (the same …rm has been reported in the last year), or (4) …rst time satisfying the reporting requirements (the …rm existed last year but has not been reported). The …rst two options are the new entrants. Further details on the reporting requirements and German FDI dataset can be found in Lipponer (2008). Table ( 2) shows that 63 percent of new entries take place in Europe. The geography of the new entrants reveals that the USA receives the largest share of the number of new entries (10.6 percent). Although 67.1 percent of entries in the USA are M&A investments, the USA has the second largest share of worldwide Green…eld entries (11.1 percent). China is the largest receiver of Green…eld investments with a share of about 15.9 percent of the total German Green…eld entries worldwide. Furthermore, table (2) shows the regional pattern of FDI destinations. Several countries that share a common border with Germany such as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Poland are among the top 10 recipients of new FDI projects. This indicates to the widely recognised border e¤ect and speaks for the inclusion of a variable measuring the distance between Germany and the …nal destination of the FDI project.
In terms of the size of the new investment, …gure (2) shows that the average …xed and intangible assets of a FDI project varies across the modes of entry and locations. For example, in 2007 the average asset ratio of a M&A project allocated out of Europe amounts to over 60 million Euro whereas this average for a M&A project within Europe is about 23 million Euro. Table ( 3) provides the means, standard deviations, 5 th percentiles, and 95 th percentiles of the variables that are used in our study according to both types of FDI. The …gures are similar across both modes of investments. We report the coe¢ cients of correlation between the variables in table (4) . The statutory The correlation between the corruption level and the statutory tax rate is very low. Table (5) presents our main estimation results. The signs of the estimated coe¢ cients on country-speci…c variables provide the directions of the e¤ects of these variables on the odds ratio of the probability of choosing a location l. In columns (1) to (3) we constrain the e¤ects of taxation to be the same across modes of FDI. The di¤erence between column (1) and (2) is the inclusion of year dummies in column (2) . To capture potential industry-speci…c location preferences, we re-estimate the benchmark model but include industry-speci…c dummies. The results are reported in column (3) . As expected, the coe¢ cient on the tax rate is negative and signi…cant in all speci…cations. This …nding is in line with studies that consider a similar exercise on the location decision of a¢ liates abroad; Buettner and Ruf (2007) However, such speci…cations ignore the heterogeneous modes of investment. In the remaining speci…cations in table (5), we allow taxation to have di¤erent impacts depending on the mode of investment. In columns (4) to (6) in table (5) , the estimated coe¢ cients on the tax rate indicate a negative response of Green…eld investments (the reference group) to high taxes. The coe¢ cients in non-linear models are not equivalent to elasticities. Marginal e¤ects in nonlinear models are conditional on all independent variables included on the model. We compute the corresponding elasticities and report the results in table (6) . The estimated elasticities are very similar across speci…cations within a sample. Therefore, we report the results for one speci…cation per sample, namely elasticities corresponding to the speci…cation including year-dummies but not industry-dummies. For example, as indicated in column (3) of table (6) , we …nd that an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent (for instance from 35% to 38.5%) reduces the probability of choosing a country to host a Green…eld investment by 6.4 percent.
Yet, the elasticity of the interaction term M &A reported in column (2) of table (6) is positive and signi…cant (0.30), but cannot be necessarily interpreted as a clear indication that M&A investments react less sensitively to international di¤erences in taxation than Green…eld investments do. As stressed in Ai and Norton (2003) , the interpretation of the estimated elasticity of the interaction term in non-linear models is not straightforward. To disentangle the estimated tax impact on M&A investments, the full interaction e¤ect should be computed. The full interaction e¤ect is a function of the cross-partial derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. Hence, its statistical signi…cance depends on the signi…cance of the whole cross-derivative, and cannot be tested with the usual t-test on the interaction term.
To be sure, we compute the full interaction e¤ect as a function of the predicted probability and the corresponding z -statistics. Figure (3) plots the results. The interaction e¤ects are positive and signi…cant for almost all observations con…rming the hypothesis that Green…eld investments react more strongly to high tax rates than M&A investments. The interaction e¤ects are insigni…-cant for few observations in the left group of …rms whose predicted probability is rather small (on the left of the lower panel of …gure 3). In line with the estimated positive interaction e¤ects, column (4) of table (6) shows that the estimated tax elasticity of M&A investments is 0.36; i.e. only about half of the tax elasticity of Green…eld investments (0.64 in column 3).
Additionally, in the remaining speci…cations in table (5) we investigate whether or not the control variables may have di¤erent in ‡uences on the location probability depending on the mode of entry. We concentrate the analysis on either the sample of Green…eld investments (columns 7 to 9) or the sample of M&A projects (columns 10 to 12). The corresponding elasticities are reported in table (6) in columns (3) and (4), respectively. According to the results, an increase in the corporate income tax rate of a 10 percent reduces the probability of choosing a country to host a Green…eld investment by about 6.4 percent. For the M&A sample, the coe¢ cient on the tax rate although signi…cant is rather small. For instance, an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent reduces the probability of a country receiving a M&A investment by 3.6 percent. The negative M&A tax elasticity is consistent with recent studies that use aggregate …gures on M&A; Di Giovanni (2005) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009) . Thus, our results suggest that M&A investments are less discouraged to locate their a¢ liates in high tax economies than Green…eld investments do.
Concerning the remaining control variables, based on the results reported in table (5) and the elasticities reported in table (6) , the presence of a¢ liated …rms and their previous year total …xed investment in assets in a location increase the probability of entering this location again in all speci…cations. Additionally, the size (population) and the level of development of the host economy (gdp per capita) both have positive signi…cant e¤ects on the odds ratio of the location probability. Distance has a negative e¤ect as expected. 9 The openness of the economy to international trade is a positive determinant of the location probability of FDI in the whole sample. However, the sub-sampling indicates that the openness variable seems to play particularly a signi…cant role in the location decision of Green…eld investments. Although the labour freedom index has the expected positive sign in all speci…cations it is insigni…cant. 10 Further, as in Javorcik and Wei (2009) we …nd that a decrease in the level of corruption, as captured by the Transparency International index, increases the probability of selecting a location for an a¢ liate. However, this index loses its signi…cance in the Green…eld sample (columns 7 to 9). This may indicate that di¤erent modes of investment may accept di¤erent conditions in the host economy. &A is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the investment takes the form of M&A and zero if the investment is a Green…eld project. The reader is referred to the data appendix for detailed description of the variables. -0.29 a -0.28 a -0.10 -0.45 a (.08) (.08) (.13) (.10) Note: Note: a , b , and c indicate signi…cance at the level of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses. The reported elasticities correspond to the models in columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) in table (5) . 
Robustness analysis
In this section, we extend our analysis to consider various potential issues in connection to the robustness of the main results. For example, high income economies may contain more attractive targets for acquisition than lower income economies. To address this issue, we split the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, and examine the e¤ects of the corporate tax rate in both sub-samples. Columns (1) and (2) of table (7) present the results. The estimated coe¢ cients on the tax rate in both sub-samples are as expected negative while the coe¢ cients on the interaction term M &A are positive. This …nding con…rms our main results presented in the previous section. The lower sensitivity of the location decision of M&A investments to di¤erences in the tax rate is robust to the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries. The estimated coe¢ cient on corruption in the non-OECD sample is negative and its magnitude becomes larger in comparison to the results obtained from the full sample (table 5) . This indicates that a high level of corruption, particularly in non-OECD host economies, reduces the likelihood of locating a new a¢ liate.
One additional question is in relation to the size of the investment. Is the e¤ect of the tax rate on the decision to locate a small investment di¤erent from the e¤ect on the decision to locate a large investment? Based on the median of total …xed and intangible assets of the new foreign investment, we distinguish between large and small a¢ liates. Columns (3) and (4) of table (7) display the estimation results obtained from both sub-samples. The results do not suggest systematic di¤erences between the responses of the location choice of large and small a¢ liates to corporate taxation.
As one could argue that large plant expansion is of a similar margin of investment as a Green…eld project, it is also of interest to account for potential e¤ects of corporate taxation on the decision on plant expansion. We exploit information on the balance sheets of German a¢ liates abroad in order to broaden the de…nition of Green…eld investments in our analysis. Particularly, in addition to new Green…eld entrants, we consider a plant expansion measured as an increase in the total balance sheet of an already existing FDI a¢ liate of more than 50 percent as a Green…eld investment. The results based upon this broad de…nition of Green…eld investments are reported in column (5) . The added Green…eld projects to the sample do not alter the tax e¤ect.
In columns (6) to (9) of table (7), we control for further country characteristics. We include in column (6) the ratio of market capitalisation of listed companies to GDP to capture available potential targets for acquisition. Related to the issue of available targets, R&D considerations may trigger M&A activities. If high tax economies are those economies associated with high ratios of R&D expenditure to GDP, then the e¤ect of the tax rate may to some extent capture R&D opportunities. We address such a possibility by adding the R&D intensity in the host economy to the set of controls. The results reported in column (7) show that the tax e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of R&D intensity. In addition, one aspect that might derive the location decision of multinational …rms is market opportunities not only in the host economy but also in the region.
We construct a proxy for the regional market potential as the sum of the GDP of the countries that are located in the same geographical region. We de…ne geographical regions based on the United Nations statistical classi…cation. This market potential proxy is estimated to have a positive sign in column (8) , but losses its signi…cance when we also include the market capitalisation measure and the R&D intensity (column 9).
While various studies …nd that the statutory corporate income tax rate has a high signi…cant predictive power for the location decision, as for example in Buettner and Ruf (2007) , for further insight we examine also the impact of the e¤ective tax rate on the location decision. Unfortunately, data on the e¤ective tax rate are available only for 32 countries (mainly OECD countries). According to our …ndings in column (10) , the impacts of taxation on the location decision of FDI …rms are very similar for both tax rate measures.
Hence, the results of the various speci…cations presented in this section are reassuring that the e¤ect of corporate taxation on the location decision is sig-ni…cantly higher for Green…eld investments than for M&A investments.
Conclusion
The empirical …ndings reported here contribute to our understanding of the role of taxation in determining the investment location decision by setting out reasons and providing empirical evidence why taxes matter. While most existing studies treat FDI as homogenous projects, our results distinguish between the compositions of FDI: M&A versus Green…eld investments. We …nd that an increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate of 10 percent reduces the probability of choosing a country to host a Green…eld investment by about 6.4 percent. M&A investments however are less sensitive to di¤erences in international tax rates as indicated by a tax elasticity of -3.6 percent. This is consistent with a (partial) capitalisation of taxes in the acquisition price. Our …ndings are robust to a set of various speci…cations. Since in the period of our sample all FDI returns are exempted from German taxation, we could not test the e¤ects of the home country tax system. With regard to policy implications, our …nding indicates that tax reforms a¤ect the composition of FDI as tax policies seem to di¤erently a¤ect the decision of M&A and Green…eld projects. This …nding also contributes to a growing literature on possible di¤erential implications of both modes of investment on the host economy. 
